Outcomes are not infrequently shaped by the way in which they are sought and this is as true of the current wave of constitutional reform in Britain as of the pursuit of political objectives in many other spheres. The reform programme examined here was wholly determined by the government that came to power in 1997 and has then been carried forward and to a substantial extent implemented by its efforts and commitment. Owing to the weakness of the official Opposition little was contributed from that quarter, whilst the greatly strengthened Liberal Democrat Party, though highly sympathetic to constitutional reform, also failed to exert significant influence despite the initial inclination of the Prime Minister to allow the party's leaders to have a consultative voice and to raise their hopes of progress towards some form of proportional electoral system for parliamentary elections. Yet despite the efforts to present the reforms as elements in a coherent reform programme, what was designed and enacted in the years after 1997 had far more the character of a palette of measures pragmatically put together and presented to Parliament and country item by item. Insofar as there was an overall ideological justification for reform this was offered in terms of 'modernisation' and 'democratisation'. But these terms are empty until given content, and no serious attempt has been made to define what they mean within the context of changes in the British constitution. In particular little was said about the values in respect of citizenship and political relationships that were to be advanced through the reform programme, and still less was there any willingness on the part of those in charge of the reforms to provide a coherent account of the kind of state or pattern of government that might be expected to have taken shape in Britain at the conclusion of the reform effort.
The record of reform so far carried out justifies the conclusion that what has been done remains well within what is widely believed to be the British tradition of pragmatic ad hoc adaptation. The range of commitments was wide, and some of them, most notably devolution, were grounded in what were perceived by many to be genuine political demands in certain parts of the country. But much else finds its place within two streams of opinion that have been influential in Britain in recent years. One of these expresses a wide-ranging critique of British institutions, presenting them for the most part as tired, out-moded and often ineffective. This might be described as the institutionalist critique, though to say this is not to imply that this approach has always been grounded in careful analysis of the conditions for institutional stability in the modern world or that those expressing it have generated all that many viable reform proposals. What is more, most exponents of the institutionalist critique tend to remain attached to many features of the existing order and so have shied away from radical innovations such as an elected second chamber, directly elected executive mayors or provision for popular initiatives. The other stream of opinion can be designated that of managerialist improvement. This has its roots in the later 1960s and was strongly expressed during the Thatcher era, at first principally with reference to the public and private sectors of the economy and then to administrative and organisational performance within the sphere of government. All this was thought to have little bearing on the constitution and practices sustained by it. 'New Labour' has also been strongly attracted to a managerialist approach to reform, especially in relation to the public services and their 'delivery'. This was recommended for application both to services for which the government has some direct responsibility and to many others for which it controls funding and the setting of standards, though having no operational responsibility at all for actual provision. In the rhetoric used to present public service reform schemes for most of the time since 1997 emphasis has been placed both on improving and expanding the services that people actually receive-better schools or shorter waiting times for hipreplacement operations -and on reforming the organisations, personnel and operational methods to be found in the public sector. To change the conditions under which many public services are financed and provided inevitably runs into many obstacles, especially in terms of persuading staff that existing practices and prevailing vested interests need to be changed. The performance-oriented view of reform in the public services did, however, from the start rub off on to the arguments advanced for constitutional reform. Much of that too has been presented as somehow or other designed to raise the performance of British institutions, improve the delivery of services, and so contribute to the overall project of making the population better off. Yet the managerialist view of constitutional reform rests on a serious confusion, a category mistake: at any rate within the tradition of liberal constitutionalism constitutional norms, rules and conventions are intended to provide conditions to be observed in the governance of the country and in the exercise of the rights of citizenship. They have little or nothing to say directly about what specific policy objectives should
